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Abstract
Early retirement is predominantly considered as the result of incentives
set by social security and the tax system. But people seem to retire early
even in the absence of such distortions as the Swiss example demonstrates.
We look for determinants of early retirement, in particular the role of
lifetime income and family status, using individual data from a selection
of Swiss pension funds. Our ﬁndings suggest that aﬀordability is a key
determinant in retirement decisions: More aﬄuent men, and — to a much
smaller extent — women, tend to leave the work force earlier. The fact
that early retirement has become much more prevalent in the last 15 years
is another indicator for the importance of aﬀordability as Switzerland’s
funded pension system has matured over that period leading to higher
eﬀective replacement rates. We also ﬁnd sizeable diﬀerences in retirement
behavior across marital status. These may be explained by a constrained
rational choice based on diﬀerential mortality and the desire of couples to
coordinate their entry into retirement.
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11 Introduction
Early retirement is a widespread phenomenon throughout Europe causing ﬁnan-
cial distress to almost all public pension systems. In most countries the main
reason for this eﬀect seems clear: High replacement ratios and high implicit tax
rates on working beyond a certain age induce workers to opt for an early exit out
of the labor market. But early retirement is also prevalent — albeit to a lesser
degree — in Switzerland, where implicit tax rates on working on in old age are
virtually zero. As of today the public (ﬁrst pillar) pension system does not even
oﬀer early retirement plans. Like in many other countries, the retirement age
has fallen in the last decade despite the fact that institutional incentives (statu-
tory retirement age, pension accrual rate, replacement rate) have stayed basically
unchanged.
The surge of early retirement in Europe may be explained by several factors.
First, gross pension replacement rates have increased in most OECD countries
since the early 1960s. Workers are more likely to withdraw from the labor market
as soon as they have reached pensionable age if beneﬁts are close to wages. Sec-
ond, pension accrual rates at older ages have fallen (and diﬀer signiﬁcantly across
OECD countries).1 If the pension accrual rate is zero there are no penalties from
withdrawing from the labor market, whereas if it is high there are incentives for
workers to continue working. The implicit tax on continued work, as proposed by
Gruber and Wise (1997), has the same impact.2 A third reason for the increase
in early retirement are changes in related beneﬁt systems, notably unemployment
and disability beneﬁts. Though not originally intended to support people in re-
tirement, changes in eligibility conditions have de facto turned these schemes into
early retirement programs in a number of OECD countries.
Although not oﬀered by the ﬁrst retirement pillar, many (mandatory) Swiss
occupational pension plans avail early retirement schemes. These range from sim-
ply oﬀering an option for early withdrawal from employment at actuarially fair
reductions in the pension beneﬁts to generous early retirement plans including
additional payments to make up for ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts up to the legal retire-
ment age. The observed retirement age in such plans is substantially below the
statutory age on average, but varies widely within and between diﬀerent pension
funds.
1The pension accrual rate is deﬁned as the gains in old-age pensions from working for an
additional period.
2The implicit tax (or subsidy) on continued work is the average annual variation in the
social security wealth relative to gross earnings obtained by postponing retirement. The social
security wealth is the sum of the discounted value of expected beneﬁts (either pensions or other
non-employment beneﬁts) minus the discounted cost of obtaining these beneﬁts.
2Why do people retire early even when the beneﬁts are adjusted to the re-
tirement age in an actuarially fair way, and when the marginal implicit tax rate
on working is unimportant? Economic theory predicts that workers choose their
intertemporal consumption and labor supply optimally according to a utility func-
tion and with respect to a lifetime budget constraint. If the adjustment for early
retirement were the same for everybody, in theory richer individuals should retire
later due to their higher life expectancy. Financial constraints of low income
workers, on the other hand, may lead to the opposite outcome in which poorer
individuals are forced to work longer (aﬀordability). Individuals may thus retire
because they can aﬀord to do so, or because they are unable to work any longer
because of bad health or the lack of opportunities. Which of the two applies is
an empirical question in the end.
In the present paper, we especially focus on the role of lifetime income on
the retirement decision. Due to the fact that the second pillar is mandatory (ac-
cumulated pension capital has to be transferred to the new plan in case of job
changes), accumulated capital at retirement is an excellent measure for lifetime
income. We ﬁnd that aﬀordability is a key determinant in retirement decisions.
Wealthier men tend to leave the work force earlier, at least up to a relatively high
average lifetime income. This may lead to a socially undesired drain of human
capital among elderly workers. Low income workers, on the other hand, often
work up to the legal retirement age even in pension funds in which early retire-
ment packages are generous. In these cases the need to generate income seems to
be the only explanation for working up to the statutory retirement year. Due to
diﬀerences in mortality rates across income groups, richer individuals thus tend
to enjoy a much longer retirement spell than poorer people. For the pension
funds, this means that adverse selection eﬀects are unimportant. Despite data
limitations, we ﬁnd that marital status is another key determinant for retire-
ment decisions. Financial needs and joint retirement problems seem to be the
dominating forces.
We also ﬁnd that the tendency to retire early has increased considerably in
the last 15 years. This ﬁnding may also be explained by aﬀordability. Due to a
maturing of Switzerland’s second pillar, more people are now able to accumulate
suﬃcient funds to pay for an early labor market exit than one or two decades
ago.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the reason for early retirement does not solely lie
in the incentive structure implied by public pension plans. The preference for
leisure in old age seems to be a dominating driving force for leaving employment.
Many poorer individuals only keep working because they cannot aﬀord to retire.
32 The Swiss social security system
Switzerland’s pension system is composed of three pillars, of which the ﬁrst and
second are of approximately equal importance.3 The ﬁrst pillar AHV/AVS4 is
a predominantly pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system and aims at providing a basic
subsistence level of income to all retired residents in Switzerland. The second
pillar, the so-called BVG/LPP5 is a mandatory, employer-based, fully funded
occupational pension scheme. Gross replacement ratios in Switzerland increased
from 28.4% in 1961 to 49.3 % in 1995. Since 1990, however, these numbers have
basically stayed unchanged. The statutory retirement age is 65 for men and
currently 62 for women, the latter will be increased gradually to 65 in the next
few years. Note that retirement at 65/62 is not mandatory by law, but reaching
age 65 for men or age 62 for women is rather an eligibility condition for claiming
public pension beneﬁts. Many labor contracts, however, specify a retirement age
coinciding with the eligibility age.
In 2000, on average, approximately 50% and 40% of publicly provided trans-
fer retirement income were paid out by the ﬁrst and second pillar, respectively.
This understates the importance of the occupational pension system, however, as
contributing agents today can expect more than half of their combined ﬁrst and
second pillar income to come from the second. The second pillar’s main goal is to
maintain the pre-retirement living standard together with the beneﬁts stemming
from the ﬁrst pillar. Upon attainment of retirement age, the accumulated capital
can be withdrawn either as a monthly life-long annuity or as a lump sum (or a
mix of the two) provided the pension fund allows for the lump sum option (which
is usually the case in deﬁned contribution plans).
Occupational pension beneﬁts are strictly proportional to the accumulated
retirement assets (retirement credits plus accrued interest). The accumulated
capital K is translated into a yearly pension B using the conversion factor γ,
B = γK. This conversion also applies to deﬁned beneﬁt plans; the fund has to
make sure that enough capital is accumulated to cover the claims made based on
previous income.
The BVG/LPP oﬀers joint annuities for men, but not for women. The con-
version factor is the same for everybody irrespective of gender, family status or
3A detailed description of all aspects of the Swiss social security system is, however, beyond
the scope of this paper. The interested reader is referred to Queissar & Vittas (2000, especially
concerning institutional details) and B¨ utler (2004, for the second pillar).
4AHV = Alters- und Hinterbliebenen-Versicherung; AVS = Assurance Vieillesse et Sur-
vivants.
5BVG = Bundesgesetz ¨ uber die beruﬂiche Alters-, Hinterlassenen- und Invalidenvorsorge,
LPP = Loi f´ ed´ erale sur la pr´ evoyance professionnelle vieillesse, survivants et invalidit´ e.
4income. Children under age 18 (or under age 25 if still dependent) of retired
persons get an additional pension of 20% of the main claimant’s beneﬁt. The
widow of a retired receives a beneﬁt amounting to 60% of the previous pension,
his dependent children a beneﬁt of 20% each. Survivor beneﬁts lead to sizeable
diﬀerences in the money worth’s ratios with respect to marital status and gender.
Apart from retirement income, the second pillar also provides insurance for
disability as well as survivors of insured active men (but not women) during the
accumulation period. The availability of disability insurance, though not origi-
nally intended to provide retirement income, might have contributed to the ob-
served tendency to retire earlier. This is most certainly also the case for Switzer-
land, albeit to a lesser degree than in other countries. Privately organized plans
are far more reluctant to grant an early exit from the labor force based on dis-
ability grounds than public programs (very often potential claimants have to see
a company related medical doctor to conﬁrm the disability).
3 Related literature
Kotlikoﬀ (1979) shows that the provision of social security will not aﬀect the
retirement decision under the assumption of perfect capital markets, actuarial
fairness and known lifespan, as pensions are equivalent to private savings. Craw-
ford and Lilien (1981) relax each assumption in turn, and show that the eﬀect
on the date of retirement is in general ambiguous, but that a progressive system
tends to advance retirement for low-income workers. Social security also has an
impact upon the labor supply decision and on the allocation of labor and con-
sumption over the life cycle. Craig and Batina (1991) simulate the strengths of
such eﬀects. Their results show how the introduction of a social security program
acts as a disincentive to supply labor in the later stages of life, thus aﬀecting also
the level of output produced and the capital-labor ratio.
In theory the social security system thus is a key variable in explaining the
retirement decision of older workers. The quantitative eﬀect of old age insurance
on retirement has been measured using one of the following three approaches:
1. The “lifetime budget constraint” approach (Burtless and Hausman, 1978;
Hausman and Wise, 1980; Venti and Wise, 1984; Burtless, 1986), in which
individuals face discontinuous or kinked budget constraints: The lifetime
budget constraint is similar to the standard labor-leisure budget constraint,
with annual working hours replaced by years of labor force participation,
and annual earnings replaced by cumulative lifetime compensation. The
optimal age of retirement is determined by a utility function deﬁned over
5years of work and cumulative compensation. This approach assumes that
individuals know with certainty the opportunities that will be available to
them in the distant future.
2. The “option value” approach (Lazear and Moore, 1988; Stock and Wise,
1990), whose central feature is the option value of continued work: The
idea is that if one retires before the early retirement age, the option of a
later bonus provided by pension plan provisions is lost. Continuing to work
preserves the option of retiring later.
3. The “hazard model” approach (Diamond and Hausman, 1984; Hausman
and Wise, 1985), which is a reduced-form technique designed to capture
the eﬀects on retirement of movements in variables such as Social Security
wealth. Implementations of this model are not perfectly “forward looking”
as the nonlinear budget constraint speciﬁcations, but allow for the updating
of information as individuals age. Moreover, these models allow to consider
not only pure economic variables (wages, pension beneﬁts, ...) but also
other non pecuniary factors, such as the health status, family circumstances
and eligibility for diﬀerent retirement schemes.
We will use the hazard model approach where the retirement decision is
treated as a dynamic discrete choice. Similar techniques have been used in other
empirical studies, such as Miniacci (1998) for Italy, Antolin & Scarpetta (1998) for
Germany and Mastrogiacomo, Alessie & Lindeboom (2002) for the Netherlands.
4 Duration models
Survival-time data documents spans of time ending in an event, called “failure”.
In our case, the failure event is entering retirement. Let T be a random variable
which describes the duration of the working period (i.e. the period before retire-
ment)6. We assume T has a continuous probability distribution f(t), where t is




f(s)ds =P r ( T ≤ t). (1)
The survival function, i.e., the probability that the spell of the working period is
of length at least t, takes the form
S(t)=1− F(t) = Pr(T ≥ t)( 2 )
6In our case, the duration is the time period between the age of 55 and the age at retirement.
As all individuals have the same time origin, our time axis does not correspond to the ”real”
time axis.
6The hazard rate (or age-speciﬁc failure rate) is the rate at which spells are com-
pleted after duration t, given that they last at least until t. In our speciﬁc case,
the hazard function is the probability of entering retirement at a certain age t,
conditional on the fact that the agent has not retired before that age. Let h(t)
denote the hazard function, so that:
h(t) = lim
dt−→0+










Duration models can be distinguished between non-parametric, semi-paramet-
ric and parametric models, on the basis of whether they predict the probability
distribution of a certain event by means of a set of individual characteristics as
explanatory variables, in this context called covariates. In this section we ﬁrst
review the Kaplan-Meier (or product-limit) estimator as an example of a non-
parametric model that is estimated without covariates. If applied to subgroups of
the data set, it is a useful tool to visualize diﬀerences across groups and to assess
the validity of assumptions used for parametric and semi-parametric survival time
models.
We then consider the case of hazard rates that depend on a set of regressors
X and parameters β to be estimated. In the present paper we choose the semi-
parametric case and describe the Cox proportional hazard model7.
4.1 Non-parametric duration models:
The Kaplan-Meier (or product-limit) estimator
We assume that the hazard function’s distribution is discrete, with atoms fj at
ﬁnitely many speciﬁed points a1 <a 2 < ... < an. The survivor function S(t)m a y




(1 − hj)( 4 )
The fj can be expressed in terms of the hj as
7In the parametric case, the density function takes a speciﬁc form, such as Weibull, log-
normal, log-logistic or Gompertz distribution. The form of the survival function and hazard
rate follows. The parametric regression allows to add covariates as in the semi-parametric case.
Note that we also carried out parametric regressions with the same covariates. As the results
were very similar to the semi-parametric case, we only display the latter.
7f1 = h1
f2 =( 1 − h1)h2
...
fj =( 1 − h1)(1 − h2)...(1 − hj−1)hj
...
fn =( 1 − h1)(1 − h2)...(1 − hn−1)hn (5)
The constraints fj ≥ 0,

fj ≤ 1 become 0 ≤ hj ≤ 1.
Let rj be the number of individuals in view at aj,a n ddj the number of
individuals who fail at aj. The likelihood function for n independent binomials,











[dj loghj +( rj − dj)log(1− hj)] (7)













The corresponding non-parametric estimator of the survivor function (called











4.2 Semi-parametric survival-time models:
The Cox proportional hazards model
Semi-parametric models enable to derive the relationship between the hazard
rate and the explanatory variables without imposing any predeﬁned functional
form for the density of the survival time T and, consequently, on the shape of the
hazard rate itself. A very common semi-parametric survival-time model is the Cox
proportional hazard model.8 The model does not assume a speciﬁc probability
8Hausman and Han (1990) and Meyer (1988) propose other semi-parametric speciﬁcations
for hazard models.
8distribution for the time until an event occurs. The eﬀect of the covariates is
captured by multiplying the hazard with a term that does not depend on time.
The hazard rate for an individual i is modeled as follows:
h(xi,t)=h0(t)Ψ(xi,β), (9)
where xi is a vector of explanatory variables and h0(t) is the “baseline” hazard
for an individual under standard conditions (x = 0), requiring Ψ(0) = 1. The
baseline hazard varies with time, but not across individuals. It is not speciﬁed in
terms of a parametric distribution but can be empirically derived from the data.
The function Ψ(xi,β) speciﬁes how the covariates are aﬀecting the hazard rate.
Its most convenient form is Ψ(xi,β)=e x p ( x 
iβ).
To estimate the parameters of the Cox proportional hazard model, one uses a
partial likelihood function, i.e., the likelihood without the baseline hazard. Cox’s
partial likelihood estimator provides a method of estimating β without requiring
estimation of h0. The variance of  β is estimated by the method of Lin and Wei
(1989).
We assume that there are D observed failures from the sample of size N.
Let j index the ordered failure times tj (j =1 ,...,D). Dj is the set of the
dj observations that fail at tj and Rj is the set of observations k that are at
risk at time tj, i.e., all observations that have not failed up to tj. The partial











This form of the likelihood is also valid in cases, in which not all survival times
are known.9 Most often one knows the minimum span a person has survived, but
not the realized survival time which is longer than the minimum registered. These
observations (in the notation used above, there are N −D) are called “censored”
observation times.
5 Data and empirical strategy
5.1 The data
In the empirical analysis we use data collected at the individual level from 15
Swiss companies, both public and private, active in several industrial branches.
9This feature of survival data is especially important in the medical sciences, as people might
still be alive when the study closes, or cannot be tracked anymore.
9They include the national public railway company, civil servants in two cantons,
several industry ﬁrms, as well as clothing and food ﬁrms. Due to lack of suﬃcient
information, we drop all observations with retirement year earlier than 1990.
The dataset consists of 8452 observations10 (9441 before dropping pre-1990
retirement, and observations without marital status). We have information about
date (or year) of birth, marital status, date (or year) of retirement, yearly pension
payments (base level) and yearly additional pensions for children and for ﬁrst
pillar replacement packages. On the ﬁrm level, we are also provided with details
of early retirement plans, in particular the adjustment in the conversion factor
and the availability of ﬁrst pillar replacement packages.
Some ﬁrms also provide us with information about the number of children
under 18/2511, the amount withdrawn as a lump sum (if this option is avail-
able), the total capital accumulated at retirement, and an indicator whether the
individual has chosen a non-standard retirement option.
As reported in Table 1, males and females represent 63.5 and 36.5 percent of
the sample, respectively. The distribution of marital status is very diﬀerent for
men and women, the great majority of men is married (85.4%) at retirement,
whereas almost half of the retiring women live alone (52.6% only are married).
There are also large diﬀerences in annuity across gender and marital status, with
women getting approximately half the amount of men on average. The only
exception are singles, for which females fare better. This can be explained by the
fact that single women are more likely to be well educated than average women,
whereas the contrary is the case for men.
The sample consists of individuals whose age at retirement ranges from 55 to
70. We explicitly exclude all observations for which the path to retirement passes
via a period of disability beneﬁts. Despite a diﬀerence of 3 years between men and
women in the statutory retirement age for individuals in the sample, the diﬀerence
in the factual retirement age is less than half of this number. The median or
average retirement age does not seem to vary very much across marital status
either. There have been, however, important changes in retirement behavior over
the last 15 years. Figure 1 depicts the distributions of the age at retirement for
men and women for three diﬀerent subperiods (1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2003).
10The cleaning and editing of the data has been a considerable task. Firstly, the data format
provided varied widely across companies. Secondly, much of the relevant information for the
project had to be imputed from other sources (regulation of pension fund) or from a combination
of available data. In many cases the information could only be gathered from a personal
interview with the responsible pension fund manager.
11Children under age 18 are always eligible for additional beneﬁts. For those over 18, but
under 25, a pension is available for disabled children and those still in school.
10The distribution of age at retirement has a peak at the respective (current)
statutory/eligibility retirement age of 65 (men) and 62 (women). For the second
time period the proﬁle for men has another peak around age 62, which is the age
at which some pension funds oﬀer early retirement beneﬁts — sometimes even
full — even for men. This peak becomes the most prominent one in the third
period. We also notice another peak at age 60. This is often the lowest age for
which early retirement packages are oﬀered at relatively good conditions. It is
interesting to note that a sizeable fraction of women work beyond the statutory
retirement age, though this number has clearly decreased over time. The most
striking feature of these distributions is a clear shift of the retirement decision to
lower ages for both men and women. This decrease is particularly strong from
1995-1999 to 2000-2003.12
It is important to mention that the fraction of people retiring early within
the included pension plans far exceeds the corresponding fraction for the whole
population. For the companies in our dataset 79% of men and 62% of women
retire before the statutory retirement age in the 2002-2003, whereas the corre-
sponding numbers for the whole of Switzerland are 55% (men) and 44% (women)
in 2002.13
insert Figure 1 & Table 1 here
5.2 The empirical strategy
A ﬁrst task is to construct a measure of second pillar income that is equivalent
across companies. This is basically equivalent to constructing a measure for
accumulated capital at retirement plus adding the present value of additional
beneﬁts to be received by the pensioners. For this purpose, we use ﬁrm speciﬁc
information on conversion factors, early retirement plans and other beneﬁts. Thus
the variable “annuity” corresponds to the yearly pension if all capital were fully
annuitized, including the regular yearly pension plus any temporary payments,
as well as the annuitized value of any lump sum payment upon retirement. To
account for economic growth and inﬂation, these numbers are deﬂated by the
nominal Swiss GDP (base year 2002). For our empirical analysis we use the log
(variable “ln(annuity)”) as well as its square (variable “ln(annuity)2”) to capture
12The median (mean) retirement age for men is 65 (63.2), 63 (62.7), and 62 (61.7) for the
periods 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2003, respectively. The corresponding numbers for
women are 62 (61.5), 62 (61.3), and 60.1 (60.2), respectively.
13Recall that, in general, low income people (and to some extent self-employed) are not
covered by second pillar pension plans. This might be a ﬁrst indicator that individuals who
retire early do so because they can aﬀord it.
11potential nonlinear eﬀects. Recall that, due to the legal requirement transfer
pension capital from a previous to the current employer, second pillar capital or
income is a very good proxy for lifetime income. Nonetheless, individual data on
retirement wealth cannot convey an exact picture of a person’s wealth position
as the latter depends on additional income and wealth by the spouse, especially
for women.
As is obvious from Figure 1, retirement behavior is very diﬀerent for men
and women. For individuals retiring before 2004, the eligibility age for old age
beneﬁts as well as many conditions within company pension plans (notably early
retirement conditions) are also very diﬀerent across gender. We thus analyze men
and women separately.
Time is bound to play an important role despite the fact that the proxy for
average life-time income has been deﬂated. Firstly, the eﬀective replacement rate
has increased due to a maturation of the system in most companies. This eﬀect
is captured by a linear time trend for the annuity variables in all estimations.
Secondly, changes to company pension plans may have inﬂuenced people’s deci-
sion to retire or not. This latter eﬀect will be captured by dummy variables by
retirement year (we also report a linear retirement eﬀect in two base estimations).
As pension plans diﬀer considerably across pension funds, we always include
company ﬁxed eﬀects. For the largest companies in the sample, estimations are
reported on the ﬁrm level.
We have too few observations on the number of children to make meaningful
inference about this parameter. The same is true — to a lesser extent — for
the fraction of accumulated capital withdrawn as a lump sum, and whether the
person has deviated from the standard option.14 Perhaps surprisingly, using ﬁrm
level estimations we ﬁnd no impact of the latter two variables on the retirement
age decision. We do, as a consequence, not report the coeﬃcients of the two
variables.
At ﬁrst sight, all retirement ages are observable, i.e., there is no obvious
censoring in the data. However, although not required by law, many companies
force people by contractual agreements to retire at the age eligible for ﬁrst pillar
beneﬁts at the latest. A late or early retirement presumably is the result of the
interaction of several reasons and options, whereas a retirement at the statutory
age is rather an automatic act without further careful considerations. This means
that we observe the eligibility age in such cases, although the person might have
14We consider a person deviating from the standard option if (s)he chooses another mix of
annuity and lump sum payments upon retirement than the standard oﬀer of the company (in
most cases a pure annuity). In many cases, individuals have to declare a non-standard pay-out
option several months (and up to three years) in advance.
12chosen to work longer had she been free to do so. A visual inspection of the
histograms in Figure 1, with obvious peaks at 65 (men) and 62 (women) seems to
support the incidence of an important bias at ages 65 and 62 for men and women,
respectively. We therefore choose to mark all observations with retirement ages
around the eligibility age as censored, i.e., we treat them as if we did not know
the reason why these individuals have retired at that age. We have experimented
with various intervals around the eligibility age, ﬁnding very small diﬀerences in
estimation outcomes. Results are reported for a censoring interval of “eligibility
age ± 3 months”. As a robustness check, we also present estimations with all
data points marked uncensored.
To classify the diﬀerent estimations with respect to censoring and the impact
of the retirement year, the following notation has been chosen:
I = no censoring, linear time trend
II = no censoring, retirement year dummies
III = with censoring, linear time trend
IV = with censoring, retirement year dummies
In parenthesis, we add the gender (m = men, f = women), as well as the number
of the company or the retirement year if applicable.
6 Empirical results
The following sections report the results of the empirical analysis carried out
with the described Swiss data set. Firstly, we present a more descriptive analysis
demonstrating the impact of several factors on the retirement decision. We then
carry out more formal tests.
6.1 Non-parametric estimation results
We have computed Kaplan-Meier survival function estimates for diﬀerent subsets
of the data (always by gender). The empirical survival functions — only reported
without censoring15 — are shown in Figures 2-4. As mentioned before, Kaplan-
Meier survival estimates show the probability of not retiring up to a certain age.
Figure 2 depicts the corresponding estimates for the three time periods 1990-
1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2003. In line with Figure 1, we observe a clear downward
15The results do not diﬀer very much if censoring is taken into account. The only diﬀerence
is around the eligibility age of 62 and 65 years for women and men, respectively. As these
observations are considered as censored, we do not observe a downward jump in the survival
probability at this point, but rather at the end of the censoring interval.
13shift in the survival function for both women and men. The huge downward jumps
at 62 for women and 65 for men, respectively, are replaced by many smaller jumps
over all concerned ages. This reconﬁrms the observation of a more ﬂexible entry
into retirement. Another striking observation is that retirement ages are not
equally spaced, but are rather concentrated at full years. This is not surprising
given the fact that adjustment rates for early retirement are usually not adjusted
in a continuous fashion, but rather in discrete intervals of one year.
To explore the impact of marital status we have split the data along that
dimension. Figure 3 shows the results for individuals retiring between 2000 and
2003.16 For both women and men, the probability of still working after age 55
is lowest for single individuals. Note, however, that single females are also the
“richest” women in the sample, while single men have the lowest average annuity
of all male retirees. So interpreting the ﬁgures without disentangling the eﬀects
of marital status and income is delicate. Married men tend to stay in the labor
force longer, while married women show a similar exit pattern like single women.
Divorced or separated women as well as widows tend to work longer.
Figure 4 shows the estimated survival function by retirement income quartile,
again for the period 2000 to 2003. For both men and women, the lowest retirement
income quartile tends to stay longest in the work force, at least until the statutory
retirement age.17 The retirement behavior as a function of income is monotonic
for women, but clearly not for men. Men in the middle income range tend to retire
earlier than both richer and poorer men. It seems as if income played a larger role
for the retirement decision of women than for men. However, retirement income
is also very much correlated with the family status for women, but far less for
men. It is thus important to control for marital status to assess the impact of
income.
insert Figures 2, 3 & 4 here
6.2 Cox proportional hazard estimation results
The Cox proportional hazard model does not assume a speciﬁc probability distri-
bution for the time until an event occurs. It assumes that the hazard functions
of any two individuals are proportional over time, even if the values of one or
16Estimates of other periods look similar (not reported here). It is important to do the
analysis by period as diﬀerent aspects, notably changes in the distribution of the marital status
over time, may interact and inﬂuence the results.
17It is worth mentioning again, that second pillar retirement income is roughly proportional
to lifetime income above a certain income level in Switzerland. The term “income” thus stands
for both retirement income and average lifetime labor income.
14more covariates are diﬀerent. As this is the main assumption of the model, we
need to check the proportional hazard assumption for all covariates we want to
use.18 We performed plots of (−ln(−ln(survival)))curves for each category of a
covariate versus (ln(analysis time)).19 The proportional hazards assumption is
not violated if the curves are parallel. In our case we observe that the curves are
approximately parallel except at the statutory retirement age of 62 for women
and 65 for men. As mentioned before, this is not surprising given the fact that
contractual agreements often force people to retire at this age. Even if one con-
siders retirement ages around the eligibility age as censored, the proportional
hazard estimation is still often violated for data beyond the statutory retirement
age. We believe, however, that these observations should still be included as they
convey important information about retirement behavior. Estimations carried
out with a truncated data set do not diﬀer very much from the complete data
set. From a visual inspection of Kaplan-Meier estimates by income (Figure 4),
hazard rates seem to depend on log(income) in a non-monotonic way. We, there-
fore, also include its square in all preliminary regressions, but only report it if its
inclusion leads to a better ﬁt of the model.
Tables 2 to 6 summarize the estimation results for various speciﬁcations and
for women and men, respectively. The results are displayed as hazard ratios. A
hazard ratio greater than 1 means that a unit increase in the covariate increases
the hazard rate by (hazard ratio - 1) × 100% . If it is smaller than 1, a unit
increase cuts the hazard rate to (1-hazard ratio)× 100%. Estimated coeﬃcients
for retirement dummies are not reported in the tables, but are summarized in
Figure 5. The number of stars (*) for retirement year dummies in the tables
indicate the level of signiﬁcance for a majority of the estimated hazard coeﬃcients:
10%, 5%, and 1% levels of signiﬁcance for a majority of coeﬃcients are marked
with (*), (**), and (***), respectively. As the year 2003 is taken as a base year,
estimates of relative hazard rates below 1 indicate that the retirement probability
has increased over the years.
Table 2 presents the results for women. Retirement year is signiﬁcant at 1%
in all regressions (if included in a linear fashion, i.e., as the number of years
prior to the base year 2003) and has a hazard ratio smaller than one. This
18We use the scaled adjustment for the Schoenfeld residuals and test the null hypothesis
that the slope is equal to zero for each covariate in the model. We also perform a global test
proposed by Grambsch and Therneau (1994). Note that the test of zero slope is equivalent to
testing that the log hazard ratio function is constant over time.
19They are often referred to as “log-log” plots. We work with quartiles for the variable
“ln(annuity)” and, for the variable “retirement year”, with the 3 time periods deﬁned earlier
(1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2003).
15means that early retirement has become more prevalent over the last decade,
which is also conﬁrmed by the estimated coeﬃcients on retirement year dummies
(Figure 5). Earlier retirement may have been caused by an improved ﬂexibility in
occupational pension plans or the maturing of the system (enabling more women
to withdraw earlier from the labor force).
Married women tend to have a higher exit rate than both singles and widows.
This result may be explained by two factors. The ﬁrst is a joint retirement
decision of married couples. As wives are younger on average than husbands,20
they may also be willing to leave the workforce at an earlier age to coordinate
the passage into retirement with their spouse. The second reason is that married
women are “hedged” by their husbands’ income and may thus have lower ﬁnancial
needs than other women. Divorcees, on the other hand, have a signiﬁcantly lower
retirement hazard even if one controls for income.
Retirement income is signiﬁcant in regressions with censored observations
(with a corresponding hazard ratio greater than one). A higher annuity thus in-
duces later retirement, the dependency being linear in logs (we could not identify
any non-linearity). Well paid women retire earlier than women with low labor
incomes, even if one controls for marital status. This means that the attractive-
ness of the job does not seem to play a role, but rather the fact that a high pre-
and after retirement income makes an earlier retirement age aﬀordable.
The corresponding results for men are summarized in Table 3. All covariates
are highly signiﬁcant in all regressions. The impact of the retirement year is
exactly the same as for women: The later we are in the time period, the earlier
is retirement on average. However, the role of the marital status is completely
diﬀerent. Married, widowed and divorced men tend to retire later than single
men. There are no obvious (statistically signiﬁcant) diﬀerences in retirement be-
havior between the former three groups when controlling for income. For men
(and unlike women), the decisive factor in the retirement behavior seems to be
the presence or absence of family ties or not.21 There are several potential ex-
planations for this ﬁnding paralleling the reasoning for women. The ﬁrst is that
a later labor market exit of married men is the result of a joint retirement deci-
sion. The second may be ﬁnancial considerations. The overwhelming majority
20The age diﬀerence in Switzerland is approximately 3 years on average. This number is
likely to understate the true age diﬀerence of a couple at retirement, as most second marriages
display a larger age diﬀerence (the divorce rate in Switzerland is approximately 40%).
21The importance of familiy ties (particularly for men) seems to be important for another
retirement decisions, the choice between an annuity and a lump sum upon retirement (see
B¨ utler & Teppa (2004)). The absence of family ties induces men to opt the annuity option,
probably because the annuity is the only form of insurance available to these men.
16of today’s elderly couples have followed a traditional role model in which the
husband is the main (or even the only) bread-winner who has to care not only
for himself, but also for his wife and children (who may still be at school). A
third potential explanation is that there are large mortality diﬀerences between
married and non-married men in favor of the former. If reductions to beneﬁts
for early retirement are actuarially fair, it is simply not optimal for married men
to retire before the statutory age. This eﬀect is reinforced by the joint annuity
model in Switzerland (early retirement would entail that future beneﬁts for the
surviving wife are reduced at the same rate).
Retirement income has a clear non-monotonic impact on the retirement age.
Up to an income that corresponds to the median second pillar income, a higher
annuity (and thus a higher average lifetime income) leads to an earlier retirement,
although lower life-expectancy for lower income workers should lead to the oppo-
site outcome. For men, this aﬀordability eﬀect is much stronger at lower incomes
than for women. It is important to stress that a median retirement income from
the second pillar is clearly above the median income of all retirees, as low-income
earners are not covered by the second pillar. The estimated peaks in the hazard
ratio (at a second pillar income of 24’000 SFR ≈ 16’000 EU for non-censored
regressions, and 35’000 SFR ≈ 23’000 EU for uncensored) correspond to a yearly
pre-retirement income of approximately 80’000 to 110’000 SFR (55’000 to 72’000
EU). The dependency of the hazard ratio on income is also depicted in Figure 6.
Aﬀordability thus seems to be a key determinant of male retirement behavior.
There is a tendency to retire as soon as the ﬁnancial situation permits (and as
soon as early retirement plans are available). Another explanation may be that
men have usually worked all their lives, in contrast to many women who had
worked only part of their lives. Men may also suﬀer from worse health and thus
retire as soon as the ﬁnancial situation permits (though this explanation is not
fully compatible with the rich — and thus on average healthier — individuals
retiring earlier!). For individuals whose retirement income is above the median
second pillar pension, aﬀordability is unlikely to play an important role. Why
the very rich again retire somewhat later than the medium rich is not obvious.
The attractiveness of the job may play a role at high income levels.
insert Tables 2 & 3, and Figures 5 & 6 here
We have also included interaction terms between marital status und retire-
ment income in our regressions to get more informative results. All these variables
turn out to be insigniﬁcant. Whether this is due to a true absence of interaction
eﬀects or due to the quality of the data, we cannot tell at this stage.
17To assess the sensitivity of our results, we have conducted regressions with
various subsets of the data set. Tables 4 and 5 report some of these results on
the ﬁrm level for both men and women, Table 6 estimates the coeﬃcients for the
three years with the highest number of observations in the dataset. Estimations
on the ﬁrm level do not diﬀer greatly from the overall regressions for the impact
of marital status and income. Due to the much smaller number of observations
the signiﬁcance levels are far lower.
One particularly interesting feature of company level estimations (Tables 4
and 5) is that they convey large ﬂuctuations in the exit rate over the years (see
Figure 5). The incidence of early retirement is higher when retirement schemes
become more ﬂexible and lower in years following such changes. In some cases
no cause for a big ﬂuctuation could be identiﬁed. It could well be that due to
ﬁnancial diﬃculty of a ﬁrm or higher returns on invested pension capital, more
people were induced to take up early retirement, altough this was not publicly
admitted.
To exlude the year eﬀect, we also estimated the model separately for the three
years with the highest number of data points (Table 6). Again, results seem fairly
robust, although signiﬁcance levels have substantially deteriorated.
insert Tables 4-6 here
There are, of course, many other determinants for which an impact on the
retirement decison can be anticipated, like health status, mortality diﬀerences or
the number of dependent children at retirement. A bad health status is likely
to induce early retirement regardless of the amount of annuity the person could
get.22 Mortality diﬀerences may have an impact on both the timing of retirement
and the choice of the payout option. As diﬀerences in mortality are usually private
knowledge,23 the best we can do is to include proxies like life-time income (the
rich live longer than the poor), and marital status (married men live longer than
singles). The impact of having dependent children on the retirement decision is
unclear, a priori. People may want to keep on working to be able to ﬁnance
their children’s expenses. But they also might want to beneﬁt from the generous
additional beneﬁts for children (even if reduced due to early retirement) as long
22Through the fact that health is usually negatively correlated with (lifetime) income, it is
not completely absent from our analysis. It may be the case that less healthy individuals might
prefer to retire early, but cannot aﬀord to do so. It is hoped that more complete data sets may
help to clarify this issue in the future.
23Even if diﬀerences in mortality were observable, they would most likely not be eligible as
criteria for lower or higher pension beneﬁts.
18as they are still eligible. The overall eﬀect will depend on the ﬁnancial situation
of a family as well as the age of the children.
7 Conclusions
Reversing early retirement trends has become a major policy issue in most Euro-
pean countries. It is clear that incentives set by the social security system will be
key in this exercise. But there might be other determinants of early retirement
that are equally important. If the preference for leisure in old age is suﬃciently
strong, for example, even negative implicit tax rates on staying in the labor force
might not induce people to work much longer. This paper has aimed to shed
some light on determinants of the retirement decision other than the impact of
social security incentives by analysing individual data from a selection of Swiss
pension funds.
The main ﬁndings from our exercise can be summarized as follows. Firstly,
there is an increasing tendency to retire early in Switzerland even in the absence
of legislative changes. The eﬀect is more pronounced for men than for women,
and was found to be especially strong in the last few years. Secondly, aﬀordability
seems to be a key determinant for the retirement decision, in particular for men.
Richer men (as measured by lifetime labor income) retire earlier than poorer men
at least up to a relatively high income. For women, the eﬀect of income on the
likelihood to exit the labor force is also positive, but far weaker than for men.
This aﬀordability interpretation may also partially explain the increase in early
retirement over the last 15 years, as Switzerland’s second pillar has matured over
this period, leading to higher eﬀective replacement rates. Thirdly, marital status
plays an important role in an individual’s retirement decision. For men, the main
diﬀerence is between singles, who retire earlier on average, and non-singles. This
hints at the importance of family ties (and of potential ﬁnancial liabilities for
children and (ex-)wives) for men. Married women tend to retire earlier than
other women, while divorced and separated women clearly work longer, probably
due to ﬁnancial constraints.
Combining our results, it seems that individuals choose their labor market
exit in a constrained rational way — at least to a certain degree. If ﬁnancial
constraints are not binding, diﬀerential mortality (as mirrored in lifetime income
and marital status) and joint retirement decisions have the impact predicted by
economic theory. This complements another result of ours with the same dateset
(B¨ utler & Teppa (2004)). The decision between a lump sum and an annuity
upon retirement can be explained by a combination of rational choice (based on
19diﬀerences in mortality, the need for insurance and the desire to leave bequests)
and an “acquiescence bias” — a majority of individuals choose the standard
option oﬀered by their pension plan.
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21Variable Obs. in % Median Mean (Std.)
Age at retirement 8452 62.0 61.82 (2.70)
female 3084 36.5 62.0 60.90 (2.58)
single 500 16.2 61.1 60.66
married 1621 52.6 61.1 60.66
widowed 279 9.1 62.0 61.39
divorced / separated 684 22.2 62.0 61.42
Age at retirement male 5368 63.5 62.1 62.35 (2.62)
single 293 5.5 62.2 61.55
married 4587 85.4 62.0 62.40
widowed 161 3.0 63.0 62.84
divorced / separated 327 6.1 62.0 62.08
Statutory retir. age 2665 31.5
(female) 1013 32.9
(male) 1652 30.8
Annuity deﬂated 8452 31’488 36’666 (30245)
female 3084 19’017 24’092 (19579)
single 500 34’196 35’364
married 1621 15’545 21’973
widowed 279 12’919 18’920
divorced / separated 684 19’290 22’984
Annuity deﬂated male 5368 37’198 43’889 (32820)
single 293 29’397 33’525
married 4587 38’535 45’156
widowed 161 30’262 39’705
divorced / separated 327 31’456 37’471
Non–standard option 576 6.8%
(female) 149 4.8%
(male) 427 8.0%
Lump–sum capital (in %) 649 7.7% 50.3% 60.0% (36.7%)
(female) 179 5.8% 100.0% 78.0% (29.7%)
(male) 470 8.8% 44.6% 53.2% (36.8%)
Table 1: Summary statistics for some relevant variables
22I(f) II(f) III(f) IV(f)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
ret. year (linear) 0.9550 — 0.9165 —
(0.000) — (0.000) —
ret. year (dummy) — YES — YES
— (*) — (***)
married 1.1044 1.0979 1.1437 1.1362
(0.095) (0.127) (0.070) (0.094)
widowed 0.9322 0.9273 0.9005 0.8952
(0.317) (0.287) (0.259) (0.243)
divorced/separated 0.8752 0.8658 0.8278 0.8184
(0.029) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008)
ln(annuity) 1.0004 1.0004 1.0016 1.0015
(0.208) (0.281) (0.000) (0.001)
Censoring NO NO YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
log p-lik. -21913.29 -21887.18 -14624.99 -14598.19
observations 3084 3084 3084 3084
failures 3084 3084 2071 2071
Table 2: Cox proportional hazard regression for women. The variable
“ln(annuity)” has been interacted with a linear time trend. Data censored for
age at retirement 61.75-62.25 (if censoring = YES).
23I(m) II(m) III(m) IV(m)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
ret. year (linear) 0.9507 — 0.9158 —
(0.000) — (0.000) —
ret. year (dummy) — YES — YES
— (***) — (***)
married 0.7960 0.8034 0.7118 0.7181
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
widowed 0.7142 0.7356 0.6475 0.6822
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
divorced/separated 0.8414 0.8481 0.8169 0.8180
(0.032) (0.046) (0.043) (0.049)
ln(annuity) 1.0391 1.0396 1.0490 1.0499
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(annuity)2 0.9981 0.9981 0.9977 0.9977
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
hazard max at 24’918 SFR 24’222 SFR 35’792 SFR 33’905 SFR
Censoring NO NO YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
log p-lik. -41222.82 -41170.7 -29317.60 -29270.98
observations 5368 5368 5368 5368
failures 5368 5368 3716 3716
Table 3: Cox proportional hazard regression for men. The variables “ln(annuity)”
and “ln(annuity)2” have been interacted with a linear time trend. Data censored
for age at retirement 64.75-65.25 (if censoring = YES).
24IV(f;1) IV(f;10) IV(f;11) IV(f;14)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
ret. year (dummy) YES (99–00) YES (90–02) YES (90–03) YES (01–02)
(–) (***) (**) (–)
married 4.9387 1.0530 1.3981 0.9346
(0.016) (0.567) (0.179) (0.684)
widowed 2.0659 0.8139 1.2882 0.7530
(0.361) (0.087) (0.351) (0.278)
divorced/separated 3.0080 0.7710 0.9115 0.6715
(0.109) (0.005) (0.671) (0.026)
ln(annuity) 1.0018 1.0020 0.9969 1.0698
(0.208) (0.001) (0.067) (0.002)
ln(annuity)2 — — — 0.9963
(0.002)
hazard max at — — — 9’967 SFR
Censoring YES YES YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
log p-lik. -529.97 -8673.22 -704.58 -1101.17
observations 228 1891 192 250
failures 106 1323 163 234
Table 4: Cox proportional hazard regression for women by company. The variables
“ln(annuity)” and “ln(annuity)2” have been interacted with a linear time trend.
Data censored for age at retirement 61.75-62.25 (if censoring = YES).
25IV(m;2) IV(m;9) IV(m;10) IV(m;15)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
ret. year (dummy) YES (00–03) YES (00–02) YES (90–02) YES (90–03)
(*) (*) (**) (**)
married 0.5407 0.7548 0.7896 0.6359
(0.001) (0.113) (0.073) (0.006)
widowed 0.6365 0.9486 0.6744 0.6906
(0.149) (0.848) (0.088) (0.116)
divorced/separated 0.7059 1.0458 0.9023 0.6784
(0.206) (0.861) (0.543) (0.075)
ln(annuity) 1.1597 1.0001 1.1271 1.0037
(0.000) (0.946) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(annuity)2 0.9931 — 0.9943 —
(0.000) (0.000)
hazard max at 42’254 SFR — 33’984 SFR —
Censoring YES YES YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
log p-lik. -4070.30 -2927.90 -9298.49 -2901.78
observations 762 600 2135 937
failures 695 489 1313 460
Table 5: Cox proportional hazard regression for men by company (4 largest com-
panies). The variables “ln(annuity)” and “ln(annuity)2” have been interacted
with a linear time trend. Data censored for age at retirement 64.75-65.25 (if
censoring = YES).
26IV(m;2000) IV(m;2001) IV(m;2002)
Covariate Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(p–value) (p–value) (p–value)
married 0.7721 0.6334 0.8387
(0.178) (0.004) (0.287)
widowed 0.9726 1.0533 0.7704
(0.926) (0.868) (0.354)
divorced/separated 0.8900 0.6298 1.0108
(0.674) (0.044) (0.962)
ln(annuity) 1.1098 1.0553 1.0451
(0.001) (0.065) (0.133)
ln(annuity)2 0.9950 0.9974 0.9978
(0.001) (0.063) (0.130)
hazard max at 32’096 SFR 27’481 SFR —
Censoring YES YES YES
Comp. ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES
log p-lik. -4035.04 -4718.67 -3564.48
observations 884 919 749
failures 663 876 598
Table 6: Cox proportional hazard regression for men by retirement year. The
variables “ln(annuity)” and “ln(annuity)2” have been interacted with a linear time
trend. Data censored for age at retirement 64.75-65.25 (if censoring = YES).
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Kaplan Meier survival estimates
Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier estimator without censoring by period for women (upper
panel) and men (lower panel). The numbers on the horizontal axis denote the
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier estimator without censoring for the period 2000-2003 by
marital status for women (upper panel) and men (lower panel). The numbers on
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Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier estimator without censoring for the period 2000-2003 by
income quartiles for women (upper panel) and men (lower panel). The numbers
on the horizontal axis denote the years after age 55.
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Figure 6: Relative hazard rates for estimation IV(m) as a function of yearly
deﬂated annuity (base = annuity of 1 SFR). ’Qx’ denotes the xth quantile of the
annuity distribution for men.
33